Christina
Aga
Dr.
Sonia Apgar Begert
English
102 – 1:00 p.m. Section
14
June 2015
“A Republic, If You Can Keep It”[1]
Campaign Finance Regulation and the
Price of Representation
Outside of the legal community, few have heard of or paid
attention to the U.S. Supreme Court rulings in the cases Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission and McCutcheon V. Federal Election Commission,
rendered in 2010 and 2014, respectively. Both of these rulings have a profound
effect on campaign finance and mark a dramatic departure from decades of law.
These rulings, delivered as a one-two punch to campaign finance regulation,
effectively eviscerate legislation meant to thwart corruption and prevent undue
influence in the political process. Though modern day campaign finance laws are
riddled with loopholes and lack regulatory clout, the majority Supreme Court
justices in Citizens United and McCutcheon under Chief Justice Roberts seem
to respond by favoring deregulation.
Under the guise of the free speech clause of the First Amendment, these
rulings allow corporations and unions to buy the influence of elected officials
and spend an unlimited amount of their general treasury funds for the purposes
of running independent electioneering communications with the Supreme Court’s
stamp of approval (Hasen 582). With unprecedented levels of campaign spending
for the 2012 mid-term presidential election, one may wonder if the 2016
presidential race will have more to do with money and less to do with politics
(Kalanick 2264).
These rulings mark a historic departure from previous
legislation, one that threatens to undermine the integrity of elected offices.
The wording of the Citizens United
ruling redefines corruption in a very literal and narrow way. The McCutcheon ruling adds insult to injury
by eliminating aggregate campaign contribution limits in a time when individual
contributions to politically minded non-profits from wealthy donors escape disclosure
requirements (Kalanick 2261). Both rulings uphold mandatory disclosure
provisions, yet these regulatory provisions have no teeth and may be easily
side-stepped, allowing for the influence of “veiled political actors” (2255).
This paper will review each of the two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, examine
how the rulings mark a departure from historical campaign finance jurisprudence,
evaluate the way campaigns are financed, and argue that these two rulings are
more harmful than helpful to campaign finance. The likely implications of the
U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Citizens
United and McCutcheon regarding
campaign contributions and political participation may very well open to doors
to undue influence from shadow parties, veiled political actors, and allow for
third party donors to avoid disclosure requirements by utilizing politically
minded non-profit organizations. In light of the undue influence that money has
in the electoral process, a government “of the people, by the people, for the
people,”[2]
may be a thing of the past; the path to representation within our so-called
democracy is paved with “donor class” dollars of the relative few (Haan 272).
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Campaign finance
regulation spans decades of legislation. Many cases reference certain Supreme
Court rulings and federal acts and, in an effort to focus on the broader
problems of the Citizens United and McCutcheon rulings, this paper will
review the highlights of campaign finance reform law as a basis for
understanding the implications of both rulings. Many of the following acts and
rulings were overturned as a result of Citizens
United, a testament to the gravity of the ruling in and of itself. This
paper begins with the domino that set off campaign finance deregulation: Citizens United.
Citizens
United V. Federal Election Commission. President Obama
referenced campaign finance deregulation in his first State of the Union
Address to Congress when he said, “With all due deference to separation of
powers, last week the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe
will open the floodgates for special interests . . . to spend without limit in
our elections” (Kalanick 2254). In a 5-4 decision in 2010, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional any federal restrictions on independent
corporate and union political expenditures in Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. This was a notable
departure from campaign finance reform laws dating all the way back to the
Tillman Act of 1907, a piece of legislation that was enacted to “protect the
political process from the real or perceived corruption caused by the undue
influence that resulted from corporate financial institutions” (Campbell 175). The
purpose of this act was two-fold: prevent illegitimate corporate involvement in
elections and protect corporate shareholder’s money from misappropriation by
disallowing corporations to utilize general treasury funds in the electoral
process (176). Corporate donations to political candidates is not new. Indeed,
corporate donations to campaigns were becoming commonplace by the 1860’s and
didn’t draw major scrutiny until 1905 when, after investigation into the
donations made by insurance company New York Life, it was revealed that nearly
73% of Theodore Roosevelt’s reelection campaign was funded by various corporations
(177). Outrage over the scandal gave rise to reform and thus the Tillman Act
was born, banning corporate campaign contributions.
Campaign reform hit a milestone in the form of a Supreme Court
decision involving amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1974. In Buckley V. Valeo, the Court made a
distinction between campaign contributions and expenditures, noting that
expenditures were protected by First Amendment rights and could not be capped,
whereas contribution caps didn’t limit political expression as much and could
be subject to limits (Gerken 906). By regulating the amount of money donated
but not the amount of money spent, the Court sought to balance money in
politics. In the 1976 Buckley ruling,
the Court contended that a contributor could exercise political speech in the
form of a donation – an important distinction that the Citizens Court would later cite with regard to corporate political
speech.
Equating monetary campaign donations to one’s right to
political speech is a puzzling concept in itself. The Court didn’t do itself
any favors by disregarding the context in which money is spent. Context matters
and, as University of Maryland School of Law Professor Deborah Hellman
contends, though “Money facilitates and incentivizes the exercise of most
rights, including speech,” it “does not show that restrictions on giving and
spending money to exercise a right constitute restrictions on that right” (Hellman
981).
Two years after Buckley, the 1978 Court ruling in First National Bank of Boston V. Bellotti
was notable for its ruling related to independent corporate expenditures and
how such expenditures were a form of speech. In his Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review article, Campbell notes that the Bellotti ruling was not about “whether
corporations have First Amendment rights and whether those rights are
coextensive with individuals’ rights,” but instead contended that
“Massachusetts’s law abridged expression that the First Amendment protected,
thus focusing on the speech itself rather than on the speaker” (Campbell 186). Campbell
stresses that the speech protection in the Bellotti
ruling was “contextually limited” (188). The majority justices in the Citizens Court ignored legal nuance and
erroneously cited the Bellotti ruling
as one that gave corporations First Amendment rights and, in doing so, equates
them to natural persons (Gilpatrick 415). This distinction is one of the Citizens United hallmarks and, in
following the line of thinking within the Roberts’ Court to date, it will
undoubtedly have bearing on future cases that deal with mandatory disclosure
requirements and bans on direct corporate campaign contributions – two of the
remaining silver linings of campaign finance reform in the wake of the Citizens ruling.
Independent expenditures by corporations on behalf of political
candidates was banned in the 1990 ruling Austin
V. Michigan Chamber of Commerce with a caveat: the ban does not apply to
individuals. This ruling underscored the distinction between person and
corporation, one that Citizens United
overturned. Later referred to as a legal “outlier,” Justice Kennedy, author of
the majority opinion in Citizens,
noted that Austin was an exception to
the general view that corporations, as a collection of voices made up of
shareholders, have First Amendment rights and, by that extension (see Buckley), are able to exercise that
right to speech and association through monetary means (Hasen 584).
McCutcheon
V. Federal Election Commission. While heavily leaning on the precedence set
forth in their Citizens ruling, in
2014 the Supreme Court ruled to deregulate campaign finance restrictions by
eliminating aggregate campaign contribution limits in McCutcheon V. Federal Election Commission (Rosen 1537). Though the
Court ruled in favor of the appellant in McCutcheon,
the majority of the justices (save Justice Thomas), ruled to keep individual
campaign contribution limits intact. The issue, they contend, regarding aggregate
limits is one of overall speech restrictions. Chief Justice Roberts, author of
the legal opinion for the ruling majority, noted, "The government may no
more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell
a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse” (Barnes). The majority ruled that
donations to a candidate’s campaign remained capped at $2,600, but the number
of candidates an individual wishes to endorse should not be limited. The Court
identified aggregate limits as a restriction to political free speech.
Prior to this ruling, cumulative contributions for candidates
running for federal political office was capped but candidates were free to
spend as much on their campaigns as they pleased; the campaign contribution-expenditure
balancing act established in Buckley
was tipped in McCutcheon. Here, the
Court argued that aggregate limits imposed on a political donor curtails the
right to free speech. Because the Court acknowledged campaign contributions as
a form of political speech, restrictions on such donations is a restriction on
political speech. In McCutcheon, we
at least have an example of an individual wishing to exercise political speech
in the form of dollars to candidates (as opposed to corporations). But, as
noted in his William & Mary Law
Review article “When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the
Sufficiency Question,” Rosen points out that “there are no restrictions on the
content of speech” (1568). As I will argue later in this paper, the ability to
circumvent donation restrictions through political action committees (PAC) and
non-profit organizations allows donors to exceed the individual limits. Dollars
do not have a political speech equivalency and the Court’s assumption that a cumulative
campaign contribution limit implies a free speech restriction is a reductionist
interpretation.
POLITICAL ACTORS
The U.S. is home to a
unique two-party system where the Democratic Party and Republican Party have
dominated the political scene since the mid-1800’s. Formal political activity
in elections, however, falls under the heavy censure of the Federal Election
Commission and strict regulations surrounding campaign activities. Indeed,
political parties are required to abide by numerous regulations and, as La Raja
notes in his Duke Journal of
Constitutional Law & Public Policy article, the current regulations
actually reinforce party polarization and force candidates to seek funding from
partisan donors (La Raja 227). Though these two parties make up the largest
portion of the formal political structure, informal political organizations are
becoming increasingly more active in their ability to influence the electoral
outcome of general elections and influence legislation. These third party
groups are independent organizations that are influencing campaigns in
remarkable ways. The manner in which independent groups influence is primarily
through lobbying and campaign endorsement.
The restrictions binding corporate political activity was
ameliorated with the creation of a political action committee. The PAC option
was a means for corporations to engage in politics without the burden of
restrictions that corporations were subject to. A corporation may form a
separate fund and create a PAC for the purposes of electing political
candidates or obtaining political influence. PACs gave corporations a “constitutionally
sufficient outlet to speak,” according to former Supreme Court Justice Souter, as
quoted in the FEC V. Wisconsin Right to
Life ruling in 2008 – an outlet deemed insufficient according to the majority
justices of the [different] Court who ruled in Citizens just two years later (Campbell 193).
While tight restrictions may influence donor recruitment, they
are also shaping the way money is funneled into the electoral politics. Donor disclosure
requirements were seen as the saving grace of campaign funding; the ‘donate and
disclose’ rhetoric was used by formal party actors calling for less Outside of
the legal community, few have heard of or paid attention to the U.S. Supreme
Court rulings in the cases Citizens
United V. Federal Election Commission and McCutcheon V. Federal Election Commission, rendered in 2010 and
2014, respectively. Both of these rulings have a profound effect on campaign
finance and mark a dramatic departure from decades of law. These rulings,
delivered as a one-two punch to campaign finance regulation, effectively
eviscerate legislation meant to thwart corruption and prevent undue influence
in the political process. Though modern day campaign finance laws are riddled
with loopholes and lack regulatory clout, the majority Supreme Court justices
in Citizens United and McCutcheon under Chief Justice Roberts seem
to respond by favoring deregulation.
Under the guise of the free speech clause of the First Amendment, these
rulings allow corporations and unions to buy the influence of elected officials
and spend an unlimited amount of their general treasury funds for the purposes
of running independent electioneering communications with the Supreme Court’s
stamp of approval (Hasen 582). With unprecedented levels of campaign spending
for the 2012 mid-term presidential election, one may wonder if the 2016
presidential race will have more to do with money and less to do with politics
(Kalanick 2264).
These rulings mark a historic departure from previous
legislation, one that threatens to undermine the integrity of elected offices.
The wording of the Citizens United
ruling redefines corruption in a very literal and narrow way. The McCutcheon ruling adds insult to injury
by eliminating aggregate campaign contribution limits in a time when individual
contributions to politically minded non-profits from wealthy donors escape disclosure
requirements (Kalanick 2261). Both rulings uphold mandatory disclosure
provisions, yet these regulatory provisions have no teeth and may be easily
side-stepped, allowing for the influence of “veiled political actors” (2255).
This paper will review each of the two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, examine
how the rulings mark a departure from historical campaign finance jurisprudence,
evaluate the way campaigns are financed, and argue that these two rulings are
more harmful than helpful to campaign finance. The likely implications of the
U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Citizens
United and McCutcheon regarding
campaign contributions and political participation may very well open to doors
to undue influence from shadow parties, veiled political actors, and allow for
third party donors to avoid disclosure requirements by utilizing politically
minded non-profit organizations. In light of the undue influence that money has
in the electoral process, a government “of the people, by the people, for the
people,”[3]
may be a thing of the past; the path to representation within our so-called
democracy is paved with “donor class” dollars of the relative few (Haan 272).
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Campaign finance
regulation spans decades of legislation. Many cases reference certain Supreme
Court rulings and federal acts and, in an effort to focus on the broader
problems of the Citizens United and McCutcheon rulings, this paper will
review the highlights of campaign finance reform law as a basis for
understanding the implications of both rulings. Many of the following acts and
rulings were overturned as a result of Citizens
United, a testament to the gravity of the ruling in and of itself. This
paper begins with the domino that set off campaign finance deregulation: Citizens United.
Citizens
United V. Federal Election Commission. President Obama
referenced campaign finance deregulation in his first State of the Union
Address to Congress when he said, “With all due deference to separation of
powers, last week the Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe
will open the floodgates for special interests . . . to spend without limit in
our elections” (Kalanick 2254). In a 5-4 decision in 2010, the U.S. Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional any federal restrictions on independent
corporate and union political expenditures in Citizens United V. Federal Election Commission. This was a notable
departure from campaign finance reform laws dating all the way back to the
Tillman Act of 1907, a piece of legislation that was enacted to “protect the
political process from the real or perceived corruption caused by the undue
influence that resulted from corporate financial institutions” (Campbell 175). The
purpose of this act was two-fold: prevent illegitimate corporate involvement in
elections and protect corporate shareholder’s money from misappropriation by
disallowing corporations to utilize general treasury funds in the electoral
process (176). Corporate donations to political candidates is not new. Indeed,
corporate donations to campaigns were becoming commonplace by the 1860’s and
didn’t draw major scrutiny until 1905 when, after investigation into the
donations made by insurance company New York Life, it was revealed that nearly
73% of Theodore Roosevelt’s reelection campaign was funded by various corporations
(177). Outrage over the scandal gave rise to reform and thus the Tillman Act
was born, banning corporate campaign contributions.
Campaign reform hit a milestone in the form of a Supreme Court
decision involving amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1974. In Buckley V. Valeo, the Court made a
distinction between campaign contributions and expenditures, noting that
expenditures were protected by First Amendment rights and could not be capped,
whereas contribution caps didn’t limit political expression as much and could
be subject to limits (Gerken 906). By regulating the amount of money donated
but not the amount of money spent, the Court sought to balance money in
politics. In the 1976 Buckley ruling,
the Court contended that a contributor could exercise political speech in the
form of a donation – an important distinction that the Citizens Court would later cite with regard to corporate political
speech.
Equating monetary campaign donations to one’s right to
political speech is a puzzling concept in itself. The Court didn’t do itself
any favors by disregarding the context in which money is spent. Context matters
and, as University of Maryland School of Law Professor Deborah Hellman
contends, though “Money facilitates and incentivizes the exercise of most
rights, including speech,” it “does not show that restrictions on giving and
spending money to exercise a right constitute restrictions on that right” (Hellman
981).
Two years after Buckley, the 1978 Court ruling in First National Bank of Boston V. Bellotti
was notable for its ruling related to independent corporate expenditures and
how such expenditures were a form of speech. In his Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review article, Campbell notes that the Bellotti ruling was not about “whether
corporations have First Amendment rights and whether those rights are
coextensive with individuals’ rights,” but instead contended that
“Massachusetts’s law abridged expression that the First Amendment protected,
thus focusing on the speech itself rather than on the speaker” (Campbell 186). Campbell
stresses that the speech protection in the Bellotti
ruling was “contextually limited” (188). The majority justices in the Citizens Court ignored legal nuance and
erroneously cited the Bellotti ruling
as one that gave corporations First Amendment rights and, in doing so, equates
them to natural persons (Gilpatrick 415). This distinction is one of the Citizens United hallmarks and, in
following the line of thinking within the Roberts’ Court to date, it will
undoubtedly have bearing on future cases that deal with mandatory disclosure
requirements and bans on direct corporate campaign contributions – two of the
remaining silver linings of campaign finance reform in the wake of the Citizens ruling.
Independent expenditures by corporations on behalf of political
candidates was banned in the 1990 ruling Austin
V. Michigan Chamber of Commerce with a caveat: the ban does not apply to
individuals. This ruling underscored the distinction between person and
corporation, one that Citizens United
overturned. Later referred to as a legal “outlier,” Justice Kennedy, author of
the majority opinion in Citizens,
noted that Austin was an exception to
the general view that corporations, as a collection of voices made up of
shareholders, have First Amendment rights and, by that extension (see Buckley), are able to exercise that
right to speech and association through monetary means (Hasen 584).
McCutcheon
V. Federal Election Commission. While heavily leaning on the precedence set
forth in their Citizens ruling, in
2014 the Supreme Court ruled to deregulate campaign finance restrictions by
eliminating aggregate campaign contribution limits in McCutcheon V. Federal Election Commission (Rosen 1537). Though the
Court ruled in favor of the appellant in McCutcheon,
the majority of the justices (save Justice Thomas), ruled to keep individual
campaign contribution limits intact. The issue, they contend, regarding aggregate
limits is one of overall speech restrictions. Chief Justice Roberts, author of
the legal opinion for the ruling majority, noted, "The government may no
more restrict how many candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell
a newspaper how many candidates it may endorse” (Barnes). The majority ruled that
donations to a candidate’s campaign remained capped at $2,600, but the number
of candidates an individual wishes to endorse should not be limited. The Court
identified aggregate limits as a restriction to political free speech.
Prior to this ruling, cumulative contributions for candidates
running for federal political office was capped but candidates were free to
spend as much on their campaigns as they pleased; the campaign contribution-expenditure
balancing act established in Buckley
was tipped in McCutcheon. Here, the
Court argued that aggregate limits imposed on a political donor curtails the
right to free speech. Because the Court acknowledged campaign contributions as
a form of political speech, restrictions on such donations is a restriction on
political speech. In McCutcheon, we
at least have an example of an individual wishing to exercise political speech
in the form of dollars to candidates (as opposed to corporations). But, as
noted in his William & Mary Law
Review article “When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? McCutcheon, Conflicts, and the
Sufficiency Question,” Rosen points out that “there are no restrictions on the
content of speech” (1568). As I will argue later in this paper, the ability to
circumvent donation restrictions through political action committees (PAC) and
non-profit organizations allows donors to exceed the individual limits. Dollars
do not have a political speech equivalency and the Court’s assumption that a cumulative
campaign contribution limit implies a free speech restriction is a reductionist
interpretation.
POLITICAL ACTORS
The U.S. is home to a
unique two-party system where the Democratic Party and Republican Party have
dominated the political scene since the mid-1800’s. Formal political activity
in elections, however, falls under the heavy censure of the Federal Election
Commission and strict regulations surrounding campaign activities. Indeed,
political parties are required to abide by numerous regulations and, as La Raja
notes in his Duke Journal of
Constitutional Law & Public Policy article, the current regulations
actually reinforce party polarization and force candidates to seek funding from
partisan donors (La Raja 227). Though these two parties make up the largest
portion of the formal political structure, informal political organizations are
becoming increasingly more active in their ability to influence the electoral
outcome of general elections and influence legislation. These third party
groups are independent organizations that are influencing campaigns in
remarkable ways. The manner in which independent groups influence is primarily
through lobbying and campaign endorsement.
The restrictions binding corporate political activity was
ameliorated with the creation of a political action committee. The PAC option
was a means for corporations to engage in politics without the burden of
restrictions that corporations were subject to. A corporation may form a
separate fund and create a PAC for the purposes of electing political
candidates or obtaining political influence. PACs gave corporations a “constitutionally
sufficient outlet to speak,” according to former Supreme Court Justice Souter, as
quoted in the FEC V. Wisconsin Right to
Life ruling in 2008 – an outlet deemed insufficient according to the majority
justices of the [different] Court who ruled in Citizens just two years later (Campbell 193).
While tight restrictions may influence donor recruitment, they
are also shaping the way money is funneled into the electoral politics. Donor disclosure
requirements were seen as the saving grace of campaign funding; the ‘donate and
disclose’ rhetoric was used by formal party actors calling for restrictions and
transparency was the trade-off. Disclosure requirements, however, do not apply
to 501(c) non-profit organizations. The 501(c) classification is mainly a
tax-exemption status given to not-for-profit organizations. Most notable non-profits
fall under the 501(c)3 category, while 501(c)4 and 501(c)6 designations are
given to politically active groups. The (c)4 designation is given to groups
that promote social welfare and civic programs. The (c)6 designation is given
to groups like chambers of commerce. A review of the main campaign funding groups
reveal that these groups – Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategy, the child of the
American Crossroads Super PAC, for example – are extremely politically active
with regard to funding candidates (Gerken 911). Under the guise of promoting social
welfare initiatives, many (c)4 organizations operate as extensions of
politically minded bodies bound by campaign finance restrictions. Large
corporations may give to large PACs, who in turn are able to liaison with [their]
(c)4 non-profits and by-pass donor disclosure requirements. This activity
allows “wealthy donors to circumvent individual contribution limits” (Kalanick
2267). Though an individual may only donate up to $2,600 to a candidate, the ability
to support as many non-profits, candidates, PACs, and parties as one wishes
renders that limit useless. McCutcheon’s
elimination of aggregate limits was the nail on the coffin for contribution
regulations. Gerken speculates that Super PACs and nonprofits have already
begun to function like shadow parties with the benefit of nondisclosure and
unlimited funding (Gerken 918).
Future
rulings. It is likely that the Court will decide
future cases with a similar deregulatory approach as the one used in the Citizens
and McCutcheon rulings. The Supreme Court took up a case, Doe V. Reed, involving individuals who are arguing that disclosure
requirements leave individuals vulnerable to harassment (Carney 2). Brendan Eichs,
CEO of Mozilla, stepped down just eight days after appointment when it was
disclosed that he donated to legislative action regarding California
Proposition 8. His donation was in support of anti-marriage equality for gay
couples and, though the donation was over six years ago, Eichs was forced to resign.
The issue of disclosure requirements is at the heart of campaign finance
regulations. The possibility that the Court may waive donation disclosure requirements
for any individual who makes a case for potential future reprisal is alarming.
CONCLUSION
In September 2014, former
Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell was convicted of corruption on eleven
counts. When his relationship with campaign donor and businessman Jonnie R.
Williams, Sr., regarding legislative support for a dietary supplement was
examined closely, it was revealed that the then-governor had returned campaign
contribution favors for legislative ones (Osnos 5). This corrupt behavior
undermines the integrity of elected offices and jeopardizes the public’s trust
in its elected officials. In commenting on McDonnell’s conviction, Osnos notes,
“The man who had occupied the office once held by Thomas Jefferson had
exchanged his power for golf trips, dresses for his wife, and rides in a sports
car” (12). The issue with this corruption isn’t the activity itself, deplorable
as it may be. The issue with this corruption involves the political system
itself. With regard to campaign funding, the laws that are currently in place
foster corruption. The Citizens United
and McCutcheon rulings have helped
create an environment of shadowed political players, one where corruption takes
root and thrives. The implications of the U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Citizens United and McCutcheon regarding campaign contributions and political
participation will continue to open to doors to undue influence from shadow
parties, veiled political actors, and allow for third party donors to avoid
disclosure requirements by utilizing politically minded non-profit organizations.
Our democracy is functioning more like a plutocracy every day and these rulings
have caused the electoral political process more harm than good. The prospects
for an honest and transparent system appears grim. Harvard Law Professor and
Director of the Center for Ethics political activist Lawrence Lessig succinctly
ponders this very issue and wonders, “How could we believe that the thickness
of one’s wallet is the metric of citizenship?” (3).
Works Cited
Barnes, Robert. "Supreme
Court strikes down limits on federal campaign donations." Washington Post 2 April 2014. Web. 7 May
2015.
Carney, Eliza N. “Rules
of the Game: Court Unlikely To Stop With Citizens United.” National Journal. National Journal, 21 January 2010. Web.
21 April 2015.
Campbell, Jason S.
"Down The Rabbit Hole With Citizens United: Are Bans On Corporate Direct
Campaign Contributions Still Constitutional?" Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 45.1 (2011): 171-206. Academic Search Premier. Web. 7 May
2015.
Gerken, Heather K. “The
Real Problem with Citizens United: Campaign Finance, Dark Money, and Shadow
Parties.” Marquette Law Review 97.4
(2014): 903-923. Academic Search Premier.
Web. 23 April 2015.
Gilpatrick, Breanne.
"Removing Corporate Campaign Finance Restrictions in Citizens United V.
Federal Election Commission, 130 S. CT. 876 (2010)." Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 34.1 (2011): 405-420. Academic Search Premier. Web. 26 May
2015.
Haan, Sarah C. “The CEO
and the Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Deregulation.” Northwestern University Law Review 109.1 (2014): 269-283. Academic Search Premier. Web. 29 April
2015.
Hasen, Richard L.
"Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence." Michigan Law Review 109.4 (2011): 581-623. Academic Search Premier. Web. 22 May 2015.
Hellman, Deborah. “Money
Talks But It Isn’t Speech.” Minnesota Law
Review 95.3 (2011): 953-1002. Academic
Search Premier. Web. 21 April 2015.
Kalanick, Cory G.
“Blowing Up The Pipes: The Use Of (C) (4) To Dismantle Campaign Finance
Reform.” Minnesota Law Review 95.6
(2011): 2254-2284. Academic Search
Premier. Web. 21 April 2015.
La Raja, Raymond J.
“Campaign Finance and Partisan Polarization in the United States Congress.” Duke Journal of Constitutional Law &
Public Policy 9.1 (2014): 223-258.
Academic Search Premier. Web. 21
April 2015.
Osnos, Evan. "Embrace
The Irony." New Yorker 90.31
(2014): 52-1. Academic Search Premier.
Web. 15 May 2015.
Rosen,
Mark D. "When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute? McCutcheon, Conflicts, And The Sufficiency
Question." William & Mary Law
Review 56.4 (2015): 1535-1611. Academic Search Premier. Web. 15 May
2015.
[1]
Benjamin Franklin quotation. See: Beeman,
Richard R. “Perspectives on the Constitution: A Republic, If You Can
Keep It.” National Constitution Center.
National Constitution Center. Web. 1 Jun 2015.
[2] Abraham
Lincoln, Draft of the Gettysburg Address: Nicolay Copy, November 1863; Series
3, General Correspondence, 1837-1897; The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D. C.: American Memory Project,
[2000-02]).
[3] Abraham
Lincoln, Draft of the Gettysburg Address: Nicolay Copy, November 1863; Series
3, General Correspondence, 1837-1897; The Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division (Washington, D. C.: American Memory Project,
[2000-02]).
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